Efficiencies and Horizontal Mergers: In
Search of a Defense

MARK N. BERRY'

A controversial issue facing U.S. antitrust law is whether horizontal
mergers involving market power should be permitted on the basis
of efficiency claims. Historically, the notion of an efficiencies
defense has met with judicial hostility, but attitudes are changing.
This Article critically analyzes the developments and argues the
case for the emergence of an absolute judicial formulation of the
defense and wider enforcement discretion.
I.

INTRODUCTION

One of the most complex and uncertain questions facing U.S. antitrust
law today is how to account for efficiency claims in the case of
horizontal mergers involving market power. Notwithstanding the
rhetoric of merger, and the inevitable claims about efficiency motivation,
studies have concluded that a significant number of mergers do not
achieve their efficiency expectations. 1 However, it is recognized that
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for the degree of Doctor of Science of Law in the Faculty of Law, Columbia University.
The author wishes to acknowledge helpful comments from Professor Harvey J.
Goldschmid, Professor Victor P. Goldberg, and Professor Robert Pitofsky in relation to
earlier drafts of this article.
l. See, e.g., DAVID J. RAVENSCRAFT & F.M. SCHERER, MERGERS, SELL-OFFS,
AND ECONOMIC EFFICIENCY (1987). While this study concentrated upon the conglomerate merger wave of the 1960s and surrounding years, it also included data of horizontal
acquisitions. Id. at 56-122.
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some horizontal mergers may involve significant economies of scale in
production2 and other efficiencies. 3 Accordingly, it is appropriate that
the potential for an efficiencies defense should be on the agenda, but the
trends just described also suggest that it is an issue which should be
approached with caution.
The defense has an uncertain past. When Congress enacted the
antitrust laws impacting on mergers, it had no appreciation of the
potential for horizontal mergers to involve both market power and
efficiencies. Rather, Congress was preoccupied with the unfair transfer
of consumers' wealth and a range of "populist" goals. 4 Against this
background it is not surprising that there has been judicial hostility to
the concept of an efficiencies defense. But the level of hostility, in
particular the hostility of the Supreme Court in the 1960s, has begun to
subside. 5
The defense has benefited from greater knowledge. Professor Oliver
E. Williamson first advanced the notion of an efficiencies defense in
1968 as an exception to the restrictive rule which had emerged in the
Supreme Court's opinions. 6 However, progress on the adoption of the
defense since 1968 has been slow. This is not surprising. The
scholarship on the defense since Williamson's seminal work has
demonstrated its complexity and uncertainty. The defense has been
raised only in a small number of cases and in circumstances where the
courts have not been required to decide the matter. Nonetheless, there

2. This proposition is not without qualification. In the short run there is the
rationalization problem of plants which are already built and this obviously impacts on
the ability to achieve plant-specific economies of scale. Plant closure may in some cases
be possible, with the most efficient units being retained or expanded. ff there is no
immediate plant closure or expansion, the merger may still yield scale economies in the
longer term. Companies with older plants are more likely to invest in large-scale
replacement and companies with increased market share are also better suited to invest
in sizeable new plants. For further discussion of these qualifications see F. M. SCHERER
& DAVID Ross, INDUSTRIAL MARKET STRUCTURE AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE 16364 (3d ed. 1990).
3. For example, product-specific economies of scale, advantages in marketing, the
infusion of superior management, and advantages in capital-raising. For an economic
critique of these claims see id. at 164-67.
4. See infra part II.B.
5. See infra part 11.C.
6. Oliver E. Williamson, Economies as an Antitrust Defense: The Welfare
Tradeojfs, 58 AM. ECON. REv. I 8 (1968) [hereinafter Williamson, Economies/Welfare
Tradeojfs]. Williamson developed his arguments for the defense in four further articles.
See Oliver E. Williamson, Economies as an Antitrust Defense: Correction and Reply,
58 AM. ECON. REV. 1372 (1968); Oliver E. Williamson, Allocative Efficiency and the
Limits of Antitrust, 59 AM. ECON. REV. PAPERS & PROC. 105 (1969); Oliver E.
Williamson, Economies as an Antitrust Defense Revisited, 125 U. PA. L. REV. 699
(1977) [hereinafter Williamson, Defense Revisited].
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has been an appreciable shift in judicial attitudes and many of these
cases have at least commented favorably on efficiency considerations.
Notwithstanding recent claims that the international competitiveness
of American firms will be threatened if some form of efficiencies
defense is not adopted,7 the progress of the defense will inevitably be
conditioned by the normal decision-making process. It may not be
difficult for the courts to continue to comment favorably on efficiencies
in future cases. But, judicial acceptance of the defense will involve a
bold move, a move which few judges may be confident enough to make.
The defense has questionable theoretical foundations and there are
significant problems involved in the formulation of a workable test. 8
This Article will outline the central issues which require consideration
if the efficiencies defense is to emerge. The scheme of this Article will
be to consider:
(1) Whether the legislative history and judicial treatment of the
efficiencies defense precludes its emergence;
(2) how certain theoretical foundations (such as the goals of antitrust,
the comparative forms of efficiency, and economic models) may
impact on the emergence and formulation of the defense;
(3) whether the defense should be based upon a net efficiencies or
absolute test;

7. See Robert Pitofsky, Proposals for Revised United States Merger E,iforcement
in a Global Economy, 81 GEO. L.J. 195, 198, 213-15 (1992). While many U.S.
corporations may view an expanded domestic production base as being critical to their
international competitiveness, such justification for the efficiencies defense may be
overstated. For example, it may be argued that concerns about international competitiveness can be accommodated by defining markets to be international in appropriate cases.
Admittedly, the definition of international markets raises complex issues, but if such an
approach is adopted it has the potential to impact dramatically on market power
assessments. See, e.g., William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Market Power in
Antitrust Cases, 94 HARV. L. REV. 937, 963 (1981); see also George Hay et al.,
Geographic Market Definition in an International Context, 64 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 71 I,
729-34 (I 988); cf Robert G. Harris & Thomas M. Jorde, Antitrust Market Definition:
An Integrated Approach, 72 CAL. L. REv. l, 57-59, 62-64 (1984) (emphasizing the
uncertainties surrounding the ability of firms to divert the potential supply of exported
goods back to the relevant market, and of foreign firms to increase supplies into the
market). Alternately, from an economics perspective, it can be argued that the adoption
of domestic terms of reference may be appropriate because active domestic rivalry is
strongly associated with international success. See MICHAEL E. PORTER, THE
COMPETITIVE ADVANTAGE OF NATIONS 644 (1990).
8. See infra parts III and IV.
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(4) whether the defense should be rejected because of measurement
ambiguities;
(5) whether the defense should set a distributional standard requiring
that the cost savings be passed on to consumeiS; and
(6) whether the defense should be available if the claimed efficiencies
can be achieved by other means, such as internal expansion or joint
ventures.
A final section will consider how enforcement discretion may accommodate the notion of an efficiencies defense, even if it does not receive
judicial recognition.
II.

CURRENT TREATMENT OF EFFICIENCIES

A.

Horizontal Mergers Generally

It is appropriate to commence with a brief outline of the current
analysis of horizontal mergers in the United States, because it is within
this framework that the efficiencies defense must be considered. The
prevailing legislation which governs mergers is section 7 of the Clayton
Act, 9 which prohibits mergers where the result may be to lessen
competition substantially or to tend to create a monopoly. 10 The
current approach to the application of section 7 reveals a preoccupation
with governmental guidelines 11 rather than case law developments.
This is due in large part to the fact that while the Supreme Court has
initiated certain analytical trends, it has not had the opportunity to refine
these since the mid-1970s. 12 Rather, the trend over recent years has
been to negotiate settlements with the enforcement agencies during the
Hart-Scott-Rodino process. 13

9. 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1973).
I 0. Other legislative provisions which have the potential to apply to horizontal
mergers are the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § I (1973) (which prohibits every contract,
combination or conspiracy in restraint of trade or commerce), and the Federal Trade
Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. § 45 (1973) (which prohibits unfair methods of competition). These provisions have potentially broader coverage than § 7 of the Clayton Act.
The question of the efficiencies defense is likely to involve the same considerations
under each of these legislative provisions as is the case under § 7.
11. Horizontal Merger Guidelines, 57 Fed. Reg. 41,552 ( 1992) [hereinafter Merger
Guidelines].
12. For a recent discussion of the case law developments relating to the analysis
of horizontal mergers, see STEPHEN F. Ross, PRINCIPLES OF ANTITRUST LAW 318-54
(1992). See also HERBERT HOVENKAMP, FEDERAL ANTITRUST POLICY: THE LAW OF
COMPETITION AND ITS PRACTICE 441-500 (1994).
13. For a discussion of Hart-Scott-Rodino procedures see I STEPHEN M. AXINN
ET AL, ACQUISITIONS UNDER THE HART-SCOTT-RODINO ANTITRUST IMPROVEMENTS
ACT (rev. ed. 1995).
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Two significant trends have emerged from the Supreme Court
opinions. First, there is the rule of presumptive illegality which is based
upon concentration and market shares. This development of the Warren
Court in the 1960s was given its clearest expression in United States v.
Philadelphia National Bank. 14 Second, in United States v. General
Dynamics Corp., 15 the only substantive horizontal merger case decided
by the Supreme Court since the Warren Court judgments, the majority
accepted this approach, but added a further step to the process. The rule
of presumptive illegality was made subject to "the absence of other
considerations. " 16
The Merger Guidelines have developed an approach which is generally
consistent with these trends, 17 but there is an increased sophistication
to the analysis. On the basis of the Merger Guidelines, horizontal
mergers are likely to be viewed as presumptively unlawful where the
merged firm will achieve a fifteen to sixteen percent market share. This
threshold may be lowered in cases where concentration in the relevant
market is high. Conversely, where concentration is low, a combined
market share in excess of sixteen percent may not be challenged.
Additionally, if one of the merging firms has less than a two percent

14. 374 U.S. 321, 363-64 (1963). The connection between a few number of firms
and the exercise of market power has been a matter of debate in the economics
literature. The various studies have demonstrated that it is difficult to develop rules of
universal application which establish a connection between concentration and market
power. Early studies suggested that concentrated markets are more likely to exhibit
features of market power, such as increases in price and reduction of output. However,
more recent studies have argued that industry structures are dictated to a large extent by
the degree to which scale economies prevail or by the comparative efficiencies of firms.
For a discussion of the early oligopoly theories see Leonard W. Weiss, The Concentration-Profits Relationship and Antitrust, in INDUSTRIAL CONCENTRATION: THE NEW
LEARNING 184, 188-93 (Harvey J. Goldschmid et al. eds., I 974). For a critical review
of these theories and wider discussion on the theories of oligopoly pricing see Harold
Demsetz, Two Systems of Belief About Monopoly, in INDUSTRIAL CONCENTRATION: THE
NEW LEARNING, supra, at 164-84. See also SCHERER & Ross, supra note 2, at 199-233.
15. 415 u. s. 486 (1974).
I 6. Id. at 497-98.
17. It has been suggested that the Merger Guidelines have one area of major
divergence from case law trends insofar as concentration is not a factor. Trends toward
industry concentration are of potential concern because a series of mergers, or indeed an
isolated merger, can transform a market to a situation where oligopoly takes control. See
Ross, supra note 12, at 334.
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market share, then combinations up to thirty percent may be permitted.18
This presumption is rebuttable. 19 For example, the presumption may
be rebutted when dominant firm behavior and coordinated interaction is
unlikely to result2° and where new entry to the market is easy.21
Market factors pertaining to both efficiencies22 and failure 23 can also
be taken into account under the Merger Guidelines. While the failing
company defense has received judicial recognition,24 the position
relating to efficiencies is unsettled.

B.

Legislative Treatment of Efficiencies

The language of section 7 of the Clayton Act is silent on the question
of efficiencies. Whether a judge-made efficiencies defense is available
under section 7 will depend on whether Congress precluded its
application or considered efficiencies to be an adverse consequence of
mergers. This question necessitates an inquiry primarily into the
legislative history of the 1950 Celler-Kefauver amendments to section
7.25

Several attempts have been made to retrace the chronology of events
leading up to these amendments, with particular reference to the
efficiencies defense. It appears to be common ground that the predominant concern in enacting these provisions related to the fear of concentration and the transfer of wealth from consumers to monopolists. 26 It
also appears to be common ground that these amendments had various
I 8. Market share under the Merger Guidelines is measured according to the
Herfindahl-Herschmann Index (HHI). The HHI is calculated by summing the squares
of the market shares of each firm in the market. If a post-merger HHI is above 1800,
the market will be regarded as highly concentrated. If the merger produces an increase
in the HHI of more than fifty points in such a market, it will be presumed to create or
enhance market power or facilitate its exercise. Merger Guidelines, supra note 11,
§ 1.5l{c); see also Pitofsky, supra note 7, at 200-01.
19. Merger Guidelines, supra note II,§ 1.5l(c).
20. Id. § 2.
21. Id. § 3.
22. Id. § 4.
23. Id. § 5.
24. For recent discussions of the evolution and elements of the failing company
defense see Timothy B. Walthall, The Failing Company Defense and Corporate
Collapse: Probing for a Rational Approach to Business Failure, 5 GEO. MASON U. L.
REV. 51 (1982); see also Richard D. Friedman, Untangling the Failing Company
Doctrine, 64 TEX. L. REV. 1375 (1986).
25. 15 u.s.c. § 18 (1973).
26. See, e.g., Timothy J. Muris, The Efficiency Defense Under Section 7 of the
Clayton Act, 30 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 381, 395-97 (1980); Alan A. Fisher & Robert
H. Lande, Efficiency Considerations in Merger Enforcement, 7 I CAL. L. REV. 1580,
1588-93 (1983).
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secondary goals, such as providing opportunities for small businesses
and encouraging corporate expansion through internal growth rather than
through merger activity. 27
Efficiency was not a significant theme in the Congressional consideration of section 7. There was limited reference to efficiency considerations in the Congressional debates. Such matters as the potential for
the merger of small firms and the acquisition of failing companies
received ambiguous, but nonetheless favorable, comment to the extent
that they would enhance efficiency. 28
Significantly, Congress did not directly address the situation of a
merger which involved both concentration concerns as well as significant
efficiencies. Therefore, it is hardly surprising that there have been
different interpretations of the legislative history relating to efficiencies.
Some have suggested that the concern about concentration is of such
magnitude as to prohibit mergers, regardless of their efficiency
characteristics. 29 But, it has also been strongly argued that a close
reading of the legislative history supports the conclusion that the new
law was not intended to preclude an efficiencies defense.Jo The
predominant view is that neither the language nor the legislative history
of section 7 precludes the application of an efficiencies defense.JI
However, the preoccupation of Congress with concerns other than
efficiency will materially impact the manner in which any efficiencies
defense may be formulated, as will be discussed later.J 2
C.

Judicial Treatment of Efficiencies

Three Supreme Court opinions dating back to the 1960s have been
viewed by some to preclude an efficiencies defense. Arguably these
decisions render the achievement of efficiencies an adverse factor in

27. See Fisher & Lande, supra note 26, at 1588-93.
28. See Muris, supra note 26, at 399-400.
29. See, e.g., Derek C. Bok, Section 7 of the Clayton Act and the Merging of Law
and Economics, 74 HARV. L. REV. 226, 318 (1960).
30. See MUR!S, supra note 26, at 396.
31. See, e.g., 4 PHILLIP AREEDA & DONALD F. TURNER, ANTITRUST LAW: AN
ANAL YSlS OF ANTITRUST PRINCIPLES AND THEIR APPLICATION 151-54 (I 980); Muris,
supra note 26, at 402; C. Paul Rogers, The Limited Case for an Efficiency Defense in
Horizontal Mergers, 58 TUL. L. REv. 503, 507-10 (1983); Pitofsky, supra note 7, at 21113.
32. See infra part III.
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assessing the legality of mergers. In more recent times, however, lower
courts have both rejected and supported the notion of an efficiencies
defense.
The first of the Supreme Court's opinions was Brown Shoe Co. v.
United States. 33 This case involved a challenge by the government of
a merger between Brown Shoe Company and G. R. Kinney Company.
Both of these companies were manufacturers and retailers of shoes. The
essential concern raised in this case was one of vertical integration and
the foreclosure of competition,34 but the Court also purported to
analyze the horizontal aspects of the merger. 35
Significantly, Brown Shoe Company did not raise efficiencies
considerations as a justification to this merger. Indeed, in an effort to
overcome the concerns of the District Court that the merged firm would
enjoy advantages that would enable it to lower prices,36 Brown Shoe
Company argued that vertical integration produced no economic
advantages. 37 This background may, to some extent, explain the
confused analysis of the Supreme Court on efficiencies issues. Chief
Justice Warren stated:
A third significant aspect of this merger is that it creates a large national chain
which is integrated with a manufacturing operation. The retail outlets of
integrated companies, by eliminating wholesalers and by increasing the volume
of purchases from the manufacturing division of the enterprise, can market their
own brands at prices below those of competing independent retailers. Of
course, some of the results of large integrated or chain operations are beneficial
to consumers. Their expansion is not rendered unlawful by the mere fact that
small independent stores may be adversely affected. It is competition, not
competitors, which the Act protects. But we cannot fail to recognize Congress'
desire to promote competition through the protection of viable, small, locally
owned businesses. Congress appreciated that occasional higher costs and prices
might result from the maintenance of fragmented industries and markets. It
resolved these competing considerations in favor of decentralization. 38

This passage does not, as has been suggested, represent a definitive
rejection of the efficiencies defense. Indeed, not only does it fail to
directly address the issue of the defense, but it is also, for the most part,
internally inconsistent. First, it suggests that efficiencies generated by
vertically integrated enterprises should be prohibited where such
enterprises can sell at prices below those of independent retailers. But

33. 370 U.S. 294 (1962).
34. Id. at 323-34.
35. Id. at 334-46.
36. United States v. Brown Shoe Co., 179 F. Supp. 721, 738 (E.D. Mo. 1959),
ajf'd, 370 U.S. 294 (1962).
37. See Muris, supra note 26, at 404.
38. Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. at 344 (I 962).
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it then suggests that such a result would be beneficial to consumers.
Secondly, it is contradictory to state that the focus of the legislation is
on "competition, not competitors," and that Congress opted "in favor of
decentralization."
Thus, it is doubtful that Brown Shoe rejects the possibility of an
efficiencies defense. Indeed, there are arguments to the contrary. At the
conclusion of its section on vertical mergers the Court implied that the
merger may be saved if it produced "any countervailing competitive,
economic, or social advantages," 39 and, in concluding remarks in its
consideration of horizontal merger issues, the Court again implied that
"no mitigating factors" had been presented in support of the merger. 40
These statements at least leave open the inference that efficiency
considerations should be taken into account.
The subsequent judgment of the Supreme Court in United States v.
Philadelphia National Bank41 has the potential to pose a more significant threat to the evolution of an efficiencies defense. This case
concerned a challenge by the government to the proposed merger of
Philadelphia National Bank and Girard Trust Com Exchange Bank, the
second and third largest commercial banks headquartered in the
Philadelphia metropolitan area. Having concluded that the consolidated
bank would control an undue percentage share of the relevant market
and that the consolidation would result in a significant increase in
concentration, such that competition would be inherently likely to be
substantially lessened, the Court turned to consider "three affirmative
justifications" advanced by the appellees. 42 One of these adjudications
has been viewed as a rejection of the efficiencies defense. Specifically,
Justice Brennan stated:
This brings us to appellees' final contention, that Philadelphia needs a bank
larger than it now has in order to bring business to the area and stimulate its
economic development. We are clear, however, that a merger the effect of
which "may be substantially to lessen competition" is not saved because, on
some ultimate reckoning of social or economic debits and credits, it may be
deemed beneficial. A value choice of such magnitude is beyond the ordinary
limits of judicial competence, and in any event has been made for us already,

39. Id. at 334.
40. Id. at 346. One possible interpretation of this latter statement, however, is that
such mitigating factors may be limited to business failure, inadequate resources, or the
need for small companies to combine to enter into more meaningful competition.
41. 374 U.S. 321 (1963).
42. Id. at 370.
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by Congress when it enacted the amended [section] 7. Congress detennined to
preserve our traditionally competitive economy. It therefore proscribed
anticompetitive mergers, the benign and the malignant alike, fully aware, we
must assume, that some price might have to be paid. 43

Closer analysis of the subject matter of this passage, however, reveals
that it should not be viewed as a condemnation of the efficiencies
defense. Philadelphia National Bank was arguing that if it was bigger
it would attract more customers into the region. This is different than
an argument that there would be efficiencies which would benefit
competition. Further, Justice Brennan had earlier noted that the
appellees' arguments about the achievement of economies of scale had
not been mentioned by the District Court and were considered abandoned in these proceedings. 44 Thus, in Philadelphia National Bank the
Court was not being asked to balance efficiencies against market power.
Rather, it was being asked to consider whether benefits to a community,
what the Court referred to as "social or economic debits and credits,"
might justify an otherwise illegal merger.
The final case in the Supreme Court trilogy is FTC v. Procter &
Gamble. 45 In this case, the Federal Trade Commission challenged the
acquisition of Clorox Chemical Company, the nation's largest manufacturer of liquid household bleach, by Procter & Gamble Company, the
largest producer of soaps, detergents, and related products. The Court
characterized this acquisition as a "product-extension merger." 46 The
arguments raised by the Commission in this case were essentially
concerns about the competitive advantages that the merged entity would
be able to achieve. The Court accepted that advertising and sales
promotion for the products of both merging firms was vital, 47 and noted
with concern "that the merger would facilitate advertising economies."48
It concluded that the merger had anticompetitive effects for two reasons.
First, it substantially reduced the competitive structure of the industry by
raising entry barriers and by dissuading smaller firms without comparable marketing power from engaging in aggressive rivalry. Second, it
eliminated the acquiring firm as a potential competitor. 49
Of particular relevance to the efficiencies defense, Justice Douglas
stated, "Possible economies cannot be used as a defense to illegality.
Congress was aware that some mergers which lessen competition may

43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
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Id. at 371 (citation omitted).
Id. at 334 n.10.
386 U.S. 568 (1967).
Id. at 570.
Id. at 573.
Id. at 57 4.
Id. at 578.
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also result in economies but it struck the balance in favor of protecting
competition."50
The Brown Shoe opinion was cited as authority for this proposition.
On a first reading, this passage appears to negate the possibility of an
efficiencies defense. However, more detailed consideration raises
questions about the weight that can be attached to this statement. The
Court's reliance on Brown Shoe and the legislative history of the
amendments to section 7 do not, as discussed earlier, provide a clear
basis for the proposition advanced in Procter & Gamble. Further, the
issue of a general efficiencies defense was not in fact placed before the
Court. The scope of the purported prohibition of the efficiencies defense
is also ambiguous and analytically incomplete. For example, does the
fact that "possible economies" are excluded from consideration, mean
that more clearly identifiable economies must also be excluded?
Additionally, the prohibition in Procter & Gamble focuses only upon
mergers involving a lessening of competition and fails to contemplate the
situation where the economies may enhance competition. 51
Clearly these three Supreme Court opinions reflect a bias against the
evolution of the efficiencies defense. However, for the reasons stated
above, it would be wrong to conclude that the Supreme Court has
expressly rejected the defense. Several other Supreme Court opinions
have, in fact, suggested that efficiencies should be taken into consideration in the general analysis of antitrust, and in relation to section 7
cases in particular. In Northern Pacific Railway v. United States 52 the
Court identified economic efficiency as one of the principal goals of
antitrust, 53 and in United States v. Gypsum Co. 54 economic efficiency
was characterized as being procompetitive. 55 The Court, in Aspen

50.

Id. at 580.
51. In considering the weight to be attached to the majority opinion in Procter &
Gamble, it is also interesting to note Justice Harlan's concurring opinion. At the outset,

he suggested that the state of economic knowledge at that time may have been
insufficient "to enable a sure-footed administrative or judicial determination to be made
a priori of substantial anticompetitive effect[s] in mergers of this kind." Id. at 599.
Justice Harlan further accepted that "economies could be used to defend a merger." Id.
at 603. Justice Harlan did not apply his analytical framework in the present case
because Procter & Gamble failed to present any true efficiencies. Id. at 604.
52. 356 U.S. I (I 958).
53. Id. at 4.
54. 438 U.S. 422 (1978).
55. Id. at 441 n.16.
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Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp.,5 6 also accepted that
monopoly conduct challenged as being exclusionary, anticompetitive, or
predatory may be justified on the basis of an efficiency explanation. 57
Finally, the exclusion of an efficiencies defense would also be contrary
to the Court's stated desire in its last significant word on section 7 to
consider economic evidence in assessing the legality of mergers. 58
The continuing judicial uncertainty surrounding the efficiencies
defense is reflected in the more recent decisions of lower courts. While
these cases have not sanctioned any mergers and are divided in their
views on the defense, the relevance of efficiencies and the possibility of
an efficiencies defense has nonetheless received surprisingly favorable
treatment given the Supreme Court's apparent bias against the defense.
The circumstances in which efficiencies have received affirmative
comment fall into several categories. First, there is the situation where
the government may seek a temporary restraining order or preliminary
injunction against a proposed merger. Section 13(b) of the Federal
Trade Commission Act conditions the issuance of any such order or
injunction to circumstances where "weighing the equities and considering
the Commission's likelihood of ultimate success, such action would be
in the public interest." 59 In weighing equities, the courts, on a number
of occasions, have taken into account various claims of procompetitive
efficiencies. 60 In so doing, Justice (then Judge) Ginsburg expressly
recognized in Weyerhaeuser that "it is permissible for the court to weigh
among 'the equities' the potential benefits, public and private, that may
be lost by a merger-blocking preliminary injunction, whether or not
those benefits could be asserted defensively in a proceeding for
permanent relief."61 A second, and analytically analogous, situation in
which efficiencies have received favorable consideration is where the
government may enter into consent decrees under which divestiture is
agreed upon to restore competitive conditions. One factor which the
courts are required to consider under section 2 of the Tunney Act62

56. 472 U.S. 585 (1985).
57. Id. at 605-11. See also Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Servs., Inc.,
504 U.S. 451, 482-83 (1992).
58. See United States v. General Dynamics Corp., 415 U.S. 486, 498-504 (1974);
United States v. Marine Bancorporation, 418 U.S. 602, 623-42 (1974).
59. 15 U.S.C. § 53(b) (1973).
60. See FTC v. Weyerhaeuser Co., 665 F.2d 1072, 1088 (D.C. Cir. 1981); FTC v.
Owens-Illinois, Inc., 681 F. Supp. 27, 52-53 (D.D.C. 1988), vacated as moot, 850 F.2d
(D.C. Cir. 1988); FTC v. Occidental Petroleum Corp., I 986-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) 'If
67,071, 62,518 (D.D.C. Apr. 29, 1986); FTC v. Great Lakes Chemical Corp., 528 F.
Supp. 84, 94 (N.D. Ill. I 98 I).
61. Weyerhaeuser, 665 F.2d at 1083.
62. 15 U.S.C. § 16(e)-(t) (1994).
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before entering into any consent judgment is whether such judgment is
in the "public interest." It has been accepted that efficiency considerations, such as cost savings, which will enable the merged company to
compete more effectively, may be a public interest factor. 63 While
none of these cases relating to restraining orders, preliminary injunctions,
and consent decrees is directly supportive of the efficiencies defense,
they at least reflect favorably upon efficiency considerations as equity
and public interest factors.
The final category of recent cases which have commented favorably
on efficiencies are those which have been directly concerned with the
legality of mergers. These cases have addressed the question of
efficiencies, but have not been required to decide upon the legality of the
efficiencies defense because the mergers in question have either been
found to be legal, 64 or have not involved any convincing claim of
efficiencies. 65 The views expressed in these cases relating to efficiency
considerations are largely of a general nature. They suggest that
efficiencies should be regarded as factors to be considered in assessing
postmerger competition. There has been only one case which has
expressly advanced the possibility of a defense, namely the judgment of
the Eleventh Circuit in University Health where Chief Judge Tjofiat
stated, "We conclude that in certain circumstances, a defendant may
rebut the government's prima facie case with evidence showing that the
intended merger would create significant efficiencies in the relevant

63. See United States v. LTV Corp., 1984-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) ,J 66,133, 66,343
(D.D.C. Aug. 2, 1984).
64. See United States v. Country Lake Foods, Inc., 754 F. Supp. 669, 680 (D.
Minn. 1990) (efficiencies were relevant as a further factor to demonstrate that the merger
would enhance competition); United States v. Carilion Health Sys., 707 F. Supp. 840,
849 (W.D. Va. 1989), aff'd mem., 892 F.2d 1042 (4th Cir. 1989) (the merger of two
hospitals would result in more efficient operations which would be able to compete more
effectively in terms of both price and quality of service).
65. See FTC v. University Health, Inc. 938 F.2d 1206, 1222 (I Ith Cir. 1991)
(appellees failed to introduce sufficient evidence of efficiencies to rebut the government's
prima facie case); United States v. United Tote, Inc., 768 F. Supp. 1064, 1084-85 (D.
Del. 1991) (efficiency claims were insufficient to offset the anticompetitive effects of the
merger, with the Court being guided in this finding, in part, by "the reality that even if
the merger resulted in efficiency gains, there are no guarantees that these savings would
be passed on to the consuming public"); American Medical Int'!, Inc., I 04 F.T.C. I, 21920 (I 984) (noted that efficiencies should be taken into account in antitrust analysis in
general and, in particular, under section 7, but concluded on the facts that there was no
establishment, with any certainty, that substantial efficiencies existed), modified, I 04
F.T.C. 617 (1984), and modified, 107 F.T.C. 310 (1986).
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market."66 Following a critical review of the Supreme Court opinions
discussed above, Chief Judge Tjoflat also concluded, "Thus, evidence
that a proposed acquisition would create significant efficiencies
benefiting consumers is useful in evaluating the ultimate issue--the
acquisition's overall effect on competition. We think, therefore, that an
efficiency defense to the government's prima facie case in section 7
challenges is appropriate in certain circumstances. "67
Notwithstanding these cases, which have at least reflected favorably
on efficiencies and the possibility of an efficiencies defense, there has
also been continued doubt about the defense. For example, in United
States v. Rockford Memorial Corporation68 the Court cited Philadelphia
National Bank as authority for the proposition that its "exclusive role is
to evaluate the merger's effect on competition for the relevant market
and no more."69 The Court nonetheless reviewed the efficiency
arguments advanced by the defendants, and concluded that most of these
claimed efficiencies should be rejected because they could be realized by
means other than merger. 70
Thus, the judicial treatment of efficiencies and the notion of an
efficiencies defense is inconclusive. On closer examination, earlier
Supreme Court opinions, while suggestive of a bias against efficiencies,
may not preclude the possibility of the defense. The most recent
decisions generally reflect a willingness to explore efficiencies.
However, it seems likely that judicial uncertainty will remain until such
time as the Supreme Court provides a definitive ruling on the defense.
III.

THEORETICAL FOUNDATIONS

A.

Efficiency as a Goal

Assuming that the defense is not precluded, it is next appropriate to
consider its theoretical foundations. The logical starting point is to
consider the relationship of the defense to the goals of antitrust. There

66. 938 F.2d at 1222.
61. Id. The Court did qualify this proposition to some extent by stating that it was
unnecessary to define the parameters of the defense because the appellees had failed to
demonstrate significant efficiencies. The Court did note, however, that some limit may
need to be placed on the defense, such as the need to establish that the efficiencies could
not be achieved by other means. Id. at n.30.
68. 717 F. Supp. 1251 (N.D. Ill. 1989), ajf'd, 898 F.2d 1278 (7th Cir.), cert.
denied, 111 S. Ct. 295 (1990).
69. Id. at 1288-89. See also United States v. Rice Growers Ass'n, 1986-2 Trade
Cas. (CCH) 167,287, 61,458 (E.D. Cal. Jan. 31, 1986) (containing arguments relating
to beneficial effects rejected on the basis of Philadelphia National Bank).
70. Rociford Memorial Corp., 71 7 F. Supp. at 1290-9 I.
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has been considerable debate on the goals of antitrust. Much of this
debate has centered upon the place of efficiency in the scheme of
antitrust. 71 While it is generally agreed that antitrust laws are designed
to promote competition, questions remain about why the competitive
process is valued as highly as the ultimate goals of antitrust. Various
goals have emerged over the first one hundred years of antitrust law in
the United States, and there is, no doubt, considerable wisdom in the
recent reflections of Professor Milton Handler that "eternal verity cannot,
in an ever-changing world, be ascribed to any one school."72
A detailed discussion of the goals of antitrust is beyond the scope of
this Article. Rather, the issue is significant in the present context
because of its importance to the theoretical foundations of the efficiencies defense. If efficiency is accepted as a proper goal of antitrust, then
it is logical that the efficiencies defense should be acceptable in theory.
However, the recognition of other goals will clearly impact on the
treatment of efficiencies claims in certain cases. Where efficiencies and
the other goals are not in conflict, no theoretical problems appear to
emerge. But an inherent conflict frequently exists between efficiencies
and the other recognized goals. In such circumstances, which values
should prevail?
While the advocates of the efficiency school of thought have
proclaimed victory in the debate,73 such pronouncement is premature.
A brief outline of the interpretative problems relating to the antitrust
statutes and, in particular to section 7 of the Clayton Act, demonstrates
why this is so.
In assessing the goals of antitrust law in the United States, the matter
is not exclusively one of economic theory. Rather, the relevant inquiry
has its genesis in the open-ended provisions of the antitrust statutes.
Fundamental terms such as "competition," "restraint of trade," "monopolize," and "unfair methods of competition" are, without further definition, inherently vague. In such circumstances, principles of statutory

71. For discussions of a range of views about the goals for antitrust, see Harlan
M. Blake et al., The Goals of Antitrust: A Dialogue on Policy, 65 COLUM. L. REV. 363
(I 965); John J. Flynn, Antitrust Jurisprudence: A Symposium on the Economic, Political
and Social Goals of Antitrust Policy, 125 U. PA. L. REV. 1182 (1977). See also
Symposium on Efficiency as a Legal Concern, 8 HOFSTRA L. REV. 485 (1980).
72. Milton Handler, Antitrust Exchange, 66 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1257 (1991).
73. See, e. g., ROBERT H. BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX: A POLICY AT WAR
WITH ITSELF ix-xiv, 426-29 (1993 ed.).
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interpretation require analysis of legislative history to ascertain
Congressional intent. Furthermore, where appropriate, such principles
also require a prediction of what Congress would have wished had it
considered a particular issue. 74 These interpretative issues are important in the present context because, when Congress first enacted antitrust
Jaws in 1890, efficiency considerations did not receive any particular
attention. The subsequent enactment of antitrust laws similarly did not
focus on efficiencies. Indeed, Congress could not have had any
appreciation of the new economic theories at the time it enacted these
laws. Against this background, it is not surprising that conflicting views
have emerged regarding the goals of antitrust.
Notwithstanding certain "populist" goals, such as the protection of
small businesses and the dispersion of economic power, which have
figured in the legislative history of the antitrust laws, particularly in
relation to the merger laws, 75 the current debate about the goals of
antitrust focuses upon two economic goals. One school of thought,
commonly referred to as the "Chicago school," states that antitrust laws
should promote allocative efficiency. 76 Many scholars of this persuasion view allocative efficiency to be an absolute goal. 77 Recently, a
rival theory has emerged that antitrust laws should primarily be viewed
to further what may be called a distributive goal which would prevent

74. See, e.g., Bersch v. Drexel Firestone, Inc., 519 F.2d 974 (2d Cir. 1975), cert.
denied, 423 U. S. 1018 (197 5) where it was noted: "We freely acknowledge that if we
were asked to point to language in the statutes, or even in the legislative history, that
compelled these conclusions, we would be unable to respond .... Our conclusions rest
on case law and commentary ... and on our best judgment as to what Congress would
have wished if these problems had occurred to it." Id. at 993. Robert Bork states that
"A legislature may never address the issue of ultimate policy goals and yet write a law
whose various categories and distinctions can be explained only by a particular policy.
That policy may then quite legitimately be said to have been intended by the legislature,
even though not a single member articulated it even to himself." BORK, supra note 73,
at 57. Professors Areeda and Turner state:
[I]n formulating rational antitrust rules and presumptions concerning various
kinds of business conduct and market structures, one must pay close attention
to what developing economic analysis and empirical studies have to say about
them. Rational antitrust interpretation must be prepared to modify, retract, or
expand its prohibitions when new economic insights strongly suggest that past
rules no longer serve antitrust objectives.
l AREEDA & TURNER, supra note 31, at 31.
75. For a discussion of the populist goals relating to the Celler-Kefauver
amendments to section 7 of the Clayton Act, see Bok, supra note 29, at 233-38.
76. See infra part III.B. for a discussion of this concept.
77. See, e.g., BORK, supra note 73, at 50-89; RICHARD A POSNER, ANTITRUST
LAW: AN ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVE 8 (1976); 1 AREEDA & TuRNER, supra note 31, at
7-33.
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the unfair acqms1t10n of consumers' wealth by firms with market
power. 78 This school of thought views consumers' surplus 79 as the
rightful entitlement of consumers.
The division between these schools of thought centers, in large part,
upon their different interpretation of what Congress meant when it
referred to the concept of consumer welfare. 80 While this debate has
concentrated on the Congressional concerns leading to the enactment of
the Sherman Act in 1890, the same policy issues were discussed in the
deliberations leading to the enactment of the Federal Trade Commission
Act and the Clayton and Celler-Kefauver Acts. 81
Those who advance allocative efficiency as the exclusive goal of
antitrust assert that "the only legitimate goal of antitrust is the maximization of consumer welfare."82 In this context it is suggested that:
Consumer welfare is greatest when society's economic resources are allocated
so that consumers are able to satisfy their wants as fully as technological
constraints permit. Consumer welfare, in this sense, is merely another term for
the wealth of the nation. Antitrust thus has a built-in preference for material
prosperity, but it has nothing to say about the ways prosperity is distributed or
used. Those are matters for other laws. 83

However, in more recent times the legislative justification for this
view has been challenged on the basis that "[g]iven the state of
economic theory at that time, the assertion that legislators supporting the
Sherman Act were influenced by considerations involving allocative
efficiency is without credibility."84 Rather, it has been suggested that
a proper review of the Congressional debates discloses a condemnation

78. See, e.g., Robert H. Lande, Wealth Transfers as the Original and Primary
Concern of Antitrust: The Efficiency Interpretation Challenged, 34 HASTINGS L.J. 65
(1982).
79. See infra part lll.C. for a discussion of this concept.
80. The term "consumer welfare" has been referred to as "the most abused term
in modem antitrust analysis." Joseph F. Brodley, The Economic Goals of Antitrust:
Efficiency, Consumer Welfare, and Technological Progress, 62 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1020,
1032 (1987). It can have a variety of meanings. It can refer to economic efficiency (in
which case the term seems unnecessary). It can also refer to some other undefined
consumer interest or to consumers' surplus.
81. See Lande, supra note 78, at I 06-42.
82. BORK, supra note 73, at 7. See also I AREEDA & TuRNER, supra note 3 I, at
7.
83. BORK, supra note 73, at 91. See also POSNER, supra note 77, at 8-18.
84. Lande, supra note 78, at 89. See also Louis Kaplow, Antitrust, Law &
Economics, and the Courts, LAW & CONTEMP. PROSS., Autumn 1987, 181, 207-08.
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of trusts and monopolies because of their ability to use market power to
raise prices and extract wealth from consumers. Thus, in considering the
concept of consumer welfare as Congress would have understood it back
in 1890, it has been suggested that the primary concern was to ensure
that consumers received the benefit of consumers' surplus. 85
Ultimately, in determining the goals of antitrust, the courts will need
to recognize the "dynamic potential'' of the legislation. 86 They will
also need to objectively assess likely economic consequences having
regard to current policies. The most recent commentaries reflect the
potential that preference may be given to a consumer surplus-based
standard. 87 If greater weight is to attach to concerns about wealth
transfer than to efficiencies, this need not result in a rejection of the
defense. However, as will be discussed later, 88 it will have the
potential to impact, in a fundamental way, how the defense may be
formulated and how it may apply in situations where the goals of
efficiency and wealth transfer are in conflict.

B.

Efficiency as a Concept

Before advancing to consider in more detail the specific theoretical
foundations and possible elements of the efficiencies defense, it is
convenient, by way of background, to reflect on the technical meanings
that can be given to the concept of efficiencies. There are two key
issues relevant to the present inquiry. First, what are the recognized
components of efficiency, and second, what comparative weight should
attach to each of these components?
The concept of efficiency has received some analysis in the industrial
organization economics literature. However, such analysis of this
fundamental economic concept is not as advanced as may be expected.
Generally speaking, economists view economic efficiency as referring to
an event that increases the total value of all economically measurable
assets in society. Economists divide the concept of efficiency into three
components: Productive, allocative, and innovative efficiencies. These
categories assist in recognizing the different efficiency qualities that may
result from events such as horizontal mergers.
Productive efficiency can best be explained with reference to the ratio
of a firm's output to its inputs. Thus, if two firms are selling the same
85. Lande, supra note 78, at 93-96.
86. See Business Elec. Corp. v. Sharp Elec. Corp., 485 U.S. 717, 732 (1988).
87. See, e.g., Ross, supra note 12, at 8-11; Herbert Hovenkamp, Legislation, Wei/Being, and Public Choice, 57 U. CHI. L. REV. 63, 74-94 (1990); HOVENKAMP, supra
note 12, at 48-71.
88. See discussion infra parts III.C., IV.C.2.
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product at $100, one will be more efficient than the other if it functions
on a lower level of inputs. Within the horizontal merger context,
productive efficiency will be achieved if the merger results in a more
cost-effective combination of productive resources of the merging firms
than would be the case should they remain independent. A common
example may be the merger of two firms each operating below minimum
efficient scale. The merger of such firms may result in the reduction of
long run average costs and this may lead to higher returns and the
potential for the merged firm to become a more potent competitive force
through, for example, reorganization of its plant. It was this category of
efficiency which appeared to be the focus of attention in Brown Shoe
and Procter & Gamble.
Allocative efficiency is a more theoretical concept and is not selfdefining in the same way as productive efficiency. It refers to the
welfare of society as a whole in the sense of the placement ofresources
in the economy where consumers will most value their output. The
concept can be explained in terms of a pricing system whereby the
output of resources will be allocated to those buyers who value them
most in terms of willingness to purchase the output or forego other
consumption. 89 Allocative efficiency is achieved when output is priced
at marginal cost. There are two critical components in assessing the
impact of an horizontal merger in allocative efficiency terms. The first
is the elasticity of demand, and the second relates to the ability of the
merged entity to reduce output or raise price. As will be discussed later,
these variables give rise to serious measurement concems. 90
The final category, innovative efficiency, relates, as its language
suggests, to achievements that will be made through invention, research
and development, and the like. 91 In the horizontal merger context, the
question to be posed is "How does the proposal enhance innovative
efficiency?"
From this brief outline of the three recognized components of
efficiency, it will be obvious that comparative assessments about the
importance of each is likely to involve theoretical controversy. For

89. See BORK, supra note 73, at 91-104; SCHERER & Ross, supra note 2, at I 9-29.
90. See discussion infra part IV.C.1.
91. In this context, it is interesting to note the recent argument of Pitofsky that
there is the need for a new research and development defense to otherwise unlawful
mergers. See Pitofsky, supra note 7, at 240-44.
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example, Professor Joseph F. Brodley has recently challenged the
traditional wisdom that allocative efficiency is the primary efficiency
goal. While recognizing that such efficiency does maximize social
wealth at a given point in time, he argues that innovative and productive
efficiencies provide "a more powerful contribution to social wealth
because they comprise the growth factors by which social wealth
increases over time."92 This debate serves to illustrate the problems
that would be inherent in any attempt to define an efficiencies defense
based on differently weighted efficiency components. However, it is a
debate which need not take place in the framing of any judge-made
efficiencies defense. First, the categories of efficiency are not necessarily in conflict,93 and second, rules can evolve without any need to
resolve this debate. Each recognized form of efficiency will be
considered in assessing the aggregate level of efficiencies, and there is
no apparent need in this exercise to prefer one form of efficiency over
another. In any event, and particularly in the case ofpremerger analysis,
the likely efficiency claims will be exclusively productive and innovative
in character. 94
C.

Efficiencies Defense in Principle

Having outlined the relationship of the efficiencies defense to the
goals of antitrust, and having considered the general characteristics
attributable to efficiencies claims, it is next appropriate to consider the
specific theoretical foundations which may apply to the defense in the
merger context.
The issue of the efficiencies defense will arise in cases where the
combined market shares of the merging firms will be presumptively
unlawful, and where such illegality is further indicated by existing
concentration levels and the absence of other factors which may rebut
the presumption, such as low entry barriers. Theoretically, where such
mergers are also likely to result in significant efficiency gains, competi-

92. Brodley, supra note 80, at 1027.
93. The concepts of allocative and productive efficiency co-exist in that "[t]he
whole task of antitrust can be summed up as the effort to improve allocative efficiency
without impairing productive efficiency so greatly as to produce either no gain or a net
loss in consumer welfare." See BORK, supra note 73, at 91. The concepts of productive
and innovative efficiency are also compatible to the extent they relate to the growth of
future social wealth. See Brodley, supra note 80, at I 026-28.
94. For example, that the merger will: (a) Involve plant rationalization; (b) result
in the reduction of Jong run average costs; (c) combine head office and related functions;
and (d) enhance research and development opportunities. Other claims such as
distribution savings (and presumably enhanced export distribution opportunities),
reductions in the cost of capital, and superior management wiJI also be frequently made.
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tion may be enhanced, prices may not rise and there may be an
improvement in resource allocation. However, viewed from a premerger
perspective, such predictions will be difficult to make. Not surprisingly,
the scholarship relating to the efficiencies defense has concentrated on
the situation where there may be an increase in market power which may
result in a reduction in output and an increase in price.
Two divergent views have emerged in relation to this difficult
theoretical question. The conflict between these views centers upon
whether allocative efficiency or the prevention of wealth transfers is the
preferred goal of antitrust. Economists have developed a model which
adopts the former goal. However, the potential application of this model
to provide a legal solution has been challenged in terms of its failure to
account for issues relating to consumers' surplus and its inability to
provide a practical framework for legal application.
The economic analysis centers upon Williamson's tradeoff model,
which can be explained with reference to Figure 1.95
Figure 1.

AC1
A2: Cost
Saving

AC2
D

0

Q2

Q1

a

95. See Williamson, Economies/Welfare Tradeojfs, supra note 6, at 21;
Williamson, Defense Revisited, supra note 6, at 707.
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This diagram illustrates the effects of a postmerger increase in market
power. As a result of this increase, the firm will reduce its output from
QI to Q2, and price will correspondingly increase from Pl to P2.
Triangle Al represents the deadweight loss which will result from this
reduction in output and increase in price.
However, at the same time, the merger produces theoretically
measurable economies, which result in a reduction in the firm's costs
from ACI to AC2. Rectangle A2 represents the cost savings to be
achieved from these economies. Williamsonian analysis asserts that if
A2 is larger than Al, the merger will produce a net efficiency gain, even
though it permits the firm to raise its price above its marginal cost. A2
will often be larger than Al because the efficiency gains illustrated by
A2 are spread over the entire output of the firm postmerger. In contrast,
the deadweight losses in Al are spread over only the reduction in output.
Williamson calculated that in a market with average elasticities of
demand and supply, a merger that produced "non-trivial" economies of
1.2% would be efficient, even if it resulted in an increase in price of
10%.96
Williamson's model has become recognized as the appropriate
economic analysis of the tradeoffbetween efficiencies and market power.
In essence, the framework is the standard economic methodology of
maximizing economic efficiency. Thus, the gains from a merger are the
decreases in resource costs of the merged firm and the losses are the
standard deadweight losses of monopoly. The deadweight loss arising
from decreased production can usually be outweighed by the cost
savings that will extend to all products actually manufactured. The
model, while attractive for its simplicity, is not however without
significant qualification. Indeed, Williamson himself referred to it as
"naive" and stated a range of qualifications. 97
Much has been written about the accuracy and workability of the
Williamson model. 98 Such qualifications impact in a significant way
on the utility of the model in the legal context. For present purposes,
the most critical qualifying factor relates to Williamson's terms of
reference concerning income distribution. Williamson refers to the

96. Williamson, Economies/We/fare Tradeojfs, supra note 6, at 22-23; Williamson,
Defense Revisited, supra note 6, at 708-09.
97. Williamson, Economies/Weifi,re Tradeojfs, supra note 6, at 23-33; Williamson,
Defense Revisited, supra note 6, at 710-13.
98. See, e.g., BORK, supra note 73, at 109-15; Muris, supra note 26, at 388-93;
HOVENKAMP, supra note 12, at 425-55; Fisher & Lande, supra note 26, at 1624-51; Alan
A. Fisher et al., Price Effects of Horizontal Mergers, 77 CAL. L. REV. 777, 794-809
(1989).
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distribution of profits between consumers and producers as "a matter of
indifference"99 and asserts that the "transformation of benefits from one
form (consumers' surplus) to another (profit) is treated as a wash under
the conventional welfare economics model." 100 While there may be
strong support for such a notion if economic efficiency is the sole goal
of antitrust, 101 such proposition clearly strikes difficulties within the
legal context if this is not the case. If the courts consider that they
should take wealth transfer issues into account, questions must inevitably
be asked about how such wealth transfers or consumers' surplus
(represented by rectangle A3) should be factored into the equation. That
Williamson's analysis does not account for income distribution renders
his model potentially redundant if this approach is adopted.
Some consideration has been given to how the model may be adjusted
to account for this factor, but such attempts have failed to find an
appropriate solution. 102 The most obvious solution would be to require
that the tradeoff be calculated on the basis that the cost savings
(represented by rectangle A2) will outweigh both the deadweight loss
and consumers' surplus (represented by rectangles Al and A3).
However, because of the likely magnitude of consumers' surplus in any
given case, and the corresponding impact that this would have on the
equation, this approach has not yet been advocated. 103 It has, however,
been suggested that a price standard can be applied to the Williamson
model whereby efficiency gains may be taken into account in circumstances where they are sufficient to prevent prices from rising. 104

99. Williamson, Economies/Welfare Tradeojfs, supra note 6, at 27.
I 00. Williamson, Defense Revisited, supra note 6, at 711.
IOI. See, e.g., BORK, supra note 73, at I 10-12 (explaining that the Williamson
model addresses the total welfare of consumers as a class, noting that shifts in income
distribution do not lessen total welfare and suggesting that decisions about the
beneficiaries of wealth should be made by the legislature rather than the judiciary).
102. See Fisher & Lande, supra note 26, at 1631-34; Fisher et al., supra note 98,
at 794-809.
I 03. See Paul S. Crampton, The Efficiency Exception for Mergers: An Assessment
ofEarly Signals from the Competition Tribunal, 21 CAN. Bus. L.J. 371,389 n.56 (1993).
I 04. See Fisher et al., supra note 98, at 796. A further theory which is currently
being developed, and which has the potential to impact significantly on this question of
consumers' surplus if it is accepted, is that efficiency improvements may offset the loss
of consumers' surplus resulting from an increase in price. Professors Gary Roberts and
Steven Salop argue that rivals will attempt to overcome the competitive advantages
created by merger-specific efficiencies by attempting to imitate those efficiencies or by
attempting to emulate them by achieving other efficiencies. For a discussion of the
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However, this proposition is questionable in circumstances where the
merged firm will have the ability to reduce output. Furthermore, it is
difficult to imagine that such a price standard, which in essence requires
the maintenance of price at level P 1, is capable of forming the basis of
a workable legal rule. Difficult questions will emerge concerning the
time frame for monitoring the price standard and the circumstances, if
any, in which upward adjustments may be made.
There are other significant qualifications to the Williamson model,
apart from wealth transfer considerations. Detailed discussion of these
is beyond the scope of this Article, but several examples illustrate the
point. The model assumes a static context which does not account or
provide for changes in product quality, or an accurate analysis over an
appropriate length of time. 105 Wider industry analysis will also be
required to assess the net social costs or benefits of a merger. Such
analysis could either support or detract from the tradeoff calculation.
For example, if the merged firm was large relative to the industry, it
may provide a price structure under which others would be required to
behave competitively. 106 But equally, significant concentration could
raise the probability of industry-wide collusion. 107
IV.

TOWARDS A DEFENSE

A.

Outline

Against the background of the uncertain theoretical foundations to the
efficiencies defense, attempts to formulate the structure and elements of
the defense will involve a number of complex issues. While there may
be no necessity to distinguish between the various forms of efficiency,
the major concern is how to accommodate the situation where efficiency
and the transfer of consumers' wealth are in conflict. No matter how
compelling the efficiencies claims may be, it is difficult to imagine that
courts will neglect consumers' surplus concerns having regard to the
legislative history of the antitrust laws. But, how to account for such
concerns and balance these with the efficiency claims will prove a

unpublished draft study of Roberts and Salop, see Joseph Kattan, Efficiencies and
Merger Analysis, 62 ANTITRUST L.J. 513, 522-27 (1994). The argument has certain
attractions in the context of developing an appropriate economic framework. However,
its translation into a test of legal application has the potential to involve insurmountable
problems because it will be impossible to predict, let alone attempt to calculate, the
likely imitation and emulation responses of rivals.
105. See Fisher & Lande, supra note 26, at 1634-36.
106. See Williamson, Economies/We/fare Tradeojfs, supra note 6, at 27.
107. See Fisher & Lande, supra note 26, at 1636-38.
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difficult task. There is no clear solution to how these conflicting values
can be accommodated in a test of universal application.
There are two structural options for the efficiencies defense, namely
a net efficiencies test and an absolute test. This section considers
whether a net efficiencies test or an absolute test should be adopted. It
then addresses three problems which are likely to be most controversial
in relation to the defense, whether it be a net efficiency or an absolute
defense. These issues are: (1) Whether the defense should be rejected
because of measurement ambiguities; (2) whether the defense should set
a distributional standard requiring that cost savings be passed on to
consumers; and (3) whether the defense should be available if the
claimed efficiencies can be achieved by other means such as internal
expansion or joint ventures. Finally, consideration will be given to the
role of enforcement discretion, a matter which will assume particular
significance if judicial treatment of the defense does not advance beyond
the current position.

B.

Structure of the Defense

If the defense is adopted by the courts, the initial debate is likely to
relate to its structure. This issue is allied to questions about measurement ambiguity. 108 The various qualities of a net efficiency and an
absolute defense will require consideration. The distinction between
these tests may not always be clear in their formulation, 109 but the two
approaches clearly have the potential to apply in different ways.
The net efficiency test is likely to be open-ended in its application.110 Under this test concentration levels significantly in excess of

See infra part IV.C. l.
It is interesting to note that there is still debate about the nature of the failing
company defense, whether it be absolute or a factor to be weighed against the test of
presumptive illegality, notwithstanding that the defense was first recognized by the
Supreme Court back in I 930. See Walthall, supra note 24, at 59-62; Friedman, supra
note 24, at 1398-99.
110. Different versions of net efficiency tests are to be found in some foreign
jurisdictions. For example, (a) Canada: § 96 of the Competition Act 1986 (Can.)
prevents the Competition Tribunal from making an order in respect of a merger if it "has
brought about or is likely to bring about gains in efficiency that will be greater than, and
will offset, the effects of any prevention or lessening of competition that will result or
is likely to result from the merger or proposed merger." Competition Act 1986 § 96
(Can.). For a discussion of the elements of this provision see PAUL S. CRAMPTON,
MERGERS AND THE COMPETITION ACT 495-554 (1990). To date, § 96 considerations do
l 08.

109.
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those which raise presumptive illegality concerns under the Merger
Guidelines may be lawful because the magnitude of the claimed
efficiencies will rebut the presumption of illegality. Some may prefer
this approach because it will provide courts with greater flexibility. But
equally, it may increase business uncertainty in circumstances where
widely divergent outcomes have the potential to emerge. Such
uncertainty may well raise compliance costs as firms endeavor to
identify mergers which will be acceptable under the antitrust laws.
Attempts to analyze such issues may also, in the context of a broad net
efficiency test, present insurmountable problems for the firm and its
advisers. Ultimately, such uncertainty may also deter firms from
engaging in merger activity. 111 Depending upon the caution with
which the courts may apply a net efficiencies defense, there is also the
potential for considerable debate to emerge about the levels of market
power which may be permitted to result from mergers.

not appear to have been particularly influential in the few cases which have considered
them. See Donald G. Mcfetridge, The Prospects for the Efficiency Defence, 26 CAN.
Bus. L.J. 321 (1996).
(b) Germany:
Section 24(3) of the Gesetz gegen
Wettbewerbsbeschraenkungen provids that the Federal Minister of Economics may
permit mergers which have been vetoed by the Federal Cartel Office where "the restraint
of competition is outweighed by advantages to the whole economy resulting from the
merger or if the merger is justified by a predominating public interest." The Minister
has intervened in very few cases. See James F. Ponsoldt and Christian Westerhausen,
Competition and/or Efficiency: A Review of West German Antimerger Law as a Model
for the Proposed Treatment ofEfficiency Promotion Under Section 7 of the Clayton Act,
9 NW. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 296, 326-31 (1988). (c) Australia and New Zealand: In both
Australia and New Zealand mergers that would otherwise breach the relevant
competition thresholds may be authorized on public benefit grounds by the Australian
Trade Practices Commission and the New Zealand Commerce Commission. See Trade
Practices Act 1974 § 90(9) (Aust!.); Commerce Act 1986 § 67 (N.Z.). The concept of
public benefit has been held to include efficiencies considerations in both jurisdictions.
See In re Queensland Coop. Milling Ass'n Ltd., 8 A.LR. 481, 516 (1976); Telecom
Corp. ofN.Z. Ltd. v. Commerce Commission, 3 New Zealand Bus. L. Cases (CCH) ,i
99-239, at 102,385 (Dec. 10, 1991). Sec. 3A of the Commerce Act 1986 (N.Z.) further
provides that efficiencies must be taken into account in determining the public benefit.
Nine mergers have been authorized on public benefit grounds in Australia. For a
discussion of these decisions, see Australian Trade Pracs. Rep. (CCH) ,i,i 8-637 to 8-642
and 8-644 to 8-646 (1995). Six mergers raising dominance concerns have also been
authorized in New Zealand on public benefit grounds. See In re New Zealand Coop.
Dairy Co. Ltd - Auckland Coop. Milk Producers Ltd. I New Zealand Bus. L.Cases
(CCH) ,i 99-518 (Commerce Commission Apr. 26, 1988); In re Natural Gas Waikato
Limited, Commerce Commission Decision 217 (May 24, 1988); New Zealand Coop.
Dairy Co. Ltd. v. Commerce Commission 3 New Zealand Bus. L. Cases (CCH) ,i 99219 (Aug. 7, 1991); In re Kiwi Coop. Dairies Ltd., Commerce Commission Decision 267
(Apr. 9, 1992); In re Natural Gas Corp. ofN. Z. Ltd., Commerce Commission Decision
269 (Oct. 29, 1992); Enerco New Zealand Ltd., Commerce Commission Decision 272
(Dec. 22, 1993).
111. See Fisher & Lande, supra note 26, at 1654-56.
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In contrast, the defense in an absolute form will, while limiting its
potential scope, result in greater certainty and preclude the potential for
the defense to have sweeping application. Several attempts have been
made at formulating an absolute efficiencies defense. For example,
Professors Areeda and Turner suggest the following absolute defense:
I. The defense should not be available where market demand is growing
substantially, unless entry clearly is easy.
2. The defense should be limited to cases in which both merging firms suffer
from substantial cost disadvantages of 5 percent, or more, from diseconomies
of scale.
3. The defense should be limited to economies in (a) plant size, (b) plant
specialization, where there is product complementarity and the diseconomies
extend to 70-80 percent of the firm's output; and possibly economies in (c)
distribution, (d) research and development, and (e) promotion, though in each
of the last three instances, the case is weak and there are qualifications. 112

The approach suggested by Areeda and Turner has not been embraced
in subsequent suggested formulations of an absolute defense. 113
Rather, given the difficulties in recognizing the impact of efficiencies,
the view is emerging that it will be most appropriate to implicitly
incorporate efficiencies into the analysis by raising the market share
thresholds of presumptive illegality. 114 Clearly, such an approach will
not be capable of properly recognizing and giving appropriate weight to
all relevant efficiency gains. However, from the point of view of
certainty and predictability the approach will have its advantages,
depending on how readily the relevant market may be identified.
Furthermore, such an approach has the potential to simplify the litigation
process and generally to reduce compliance costs. Professor Robert
Pitofsky has provided the most recent suggestion of an absolute
formulation of the efficiencies defense. He submits that:
112. 4 AREEDA & TURNER, supra note 31, at 147-48. Certain other proof
requirements also form part of this test. Id. at 148.
I 13. Indeed, certain aspects of the Areeda and Turner formulation have been
questioned. It has been suggested that it is inappropriate to limit the application of the
defense to markets that are declining, stable or expanding very slowly. See Pitofsky,
supra note 7, at 221. In this context the Areeda and Turner test may be challenged by
its implicit recognition that the possibility of internal expansion may preclude the
application of the efficiencies defense. It has also been suggested that the defense
should be available where the potential cost savings are at a lower level than five
percent, such as one to two percent. See Muris, supra note 26, at 418.
114. See Fisher & Lande, supra note 26, at 1669-77. Areeda and Turner reject the
need for market shares to be factored into the formulation of any absolute efficiencies
defense. See 4 AREEDA & TURNER, supra note 31, at 197.
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In any market where postmerger concentration is moderate, and the combined
company after the merger would hold less than thirty-five percent of the market,
a horizontal merger should be legal if the defendants can clearly support the
claim that production efficiencies leading to a substantial reduction in unit costs
will result and these efficiencies could not be achieved through a much less
restrictive altemative. 115

Given the complexity of the efficiencies defense and the uncertainty
that may attach to any unlimited formulation of the defense it seems
likely that, if the defense is to develop, it will do so in some absolute
form. The Pitofsky formulation provides a suitable starting point if this
approach is adopted, although the question will inevitably arise whether
the thirty-five percent market share level is appropriate. Such an
approach is likely to be viewed as the best practical option, although
clearly it will be open to criticism to the extent that it may not give
appropriate weight to claimed efficiencies in any given case.
C.

1.

Three Problems

Measurement Ambiguities

Judge (then Professor) Posner has referred to efficiencies as "an
intractable subject for litigation." 116 This is the generally acknowledged view/ 17 and indeed, problems surrounding the measurement of
efficiencies have even caused leading Chicago school scholars to reject
the efficiencies defense. 118
To begin, there are information problems. The merging firms may be
the only potential source of information about the claimed efficiencies.
Clearly, they will have the incentive to exaggerate their efficiency claims
and to ignore any potential diseconomies or other costs. Confidentiality
issues may also impact upon the flow of information and the weight that

115. Pitofsky, supra note 7, at 218. It is also possible to interpret one other
suggested formulation of the defense as absolute. Muris suggests that measurement
difficulties should not preclude the application of the defense and that the merger should
be judged to be procompetitive in a showing of "nontrivial economies." This seems an
extreme formulation which is unlikely to receive judicial acceptance. See Muris, supra
note 26, at 419-26.
116. POSNER, supra note 77, at 112.
117. Some economists may suggest that efficiencies are quantifiable. See, e.g., Avi
Weiss, Using the Efficiencies Defense in Horizontal Mergers, 37 ANTITRUST BULL. 123
(1992). However, such attempted formulations of the defense do not provide an
appropriate framework for legal analysis.
118. BORI<, supra note 73, at 124-29; POSNER, supra note 77, at 112.
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can be attached to it. 119 A further problem is the speculative nature of
the claims. Such claims will typically be made in a premerger context
in which the decision-makers can do no more than predict future
industry outcomes. 120 It is, therefore, inevitable that efficiency claims
should be viewed with skepticism and treated with caution.
Different levels of measurement ambiguities arise in relation to the net
efficiency and absolute defense tests suggested above. Indeed, the
absolute defense proposals have been advanced in large part for the
reason that they will lead to greater certainty in the decision-making
process.
It is generally acknowledged that the Williamson tradeoff model does
not have practical application in analyzing individual merger proposals.
Professor Robert H. Bork states the reasons for this:
Possibly accurate measurement of the actual situation [involving the measurement of efficiencies and dead weight loss] is not even a theoretical possibility;
much less is there any hope of arriving at a correct estimate of the hypothetical
situation. Consider two of the factors that would have to be known: The
demand curve over all possible relevant ranges of output and the marginal cost
curve over those same ranges. Only by knowing where marginal cost and
demand intersect could one know whether there was a restriction of output and
what its size was. Nobody knows these curves. Even the companies involved
do not ....
There is a good reason why firms do not know these things, and it is the
same reason why they cannot be known through an antitrust trial. The demand
curve is not known because it changes continually and because the company is
not constantly plotting it by running its prices up and down. The attempt to do
so might make a minor contribution to science, but quite a research grant would

119. For further discussion of information problems, see Dennis A. Yao & Thomas
N. Dahdouh, Information Problems in Merger Decision Making and Their Impact on
Development of an Efficiencies Defense, 62 ANTITRUST L. J. 23, 28-35 (1993).
120. Such problems may be overcome under a regime, such as Canada's, where
mergers may be conditionally cleared and then subsequently reviewed to determine if
the claimed efficiencies have eventuated. However, there is strong opposition to such
an approach in the U. S. Postrnerger evidence may not be reliable, because the merged
firm can manipulate prices and costs. Market outcomes, such as the departure of a rival,
are also beyond the control of the merged firm. There is also a strong judicial reluctance
to supervising future industry conduct and a concern that a policy of postmerger analysis
may discourage firms from engaging in merger activity. For further discussion of the
case against postrnerger review, see Pitofsky, supra note 7, at 222-27. Cf Brodley,
supra note 80, at I 048-53 (arguing that there should be a two-stage procedure: First,
analyze whether the efficiencies were plausible; second, an ex post inquiry to determine
if, in fact, the promised efficiencies had resulted).
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be required, since the losses incurred in an attempt by a major company might
make serious inroads on the resources of even the Ford Foundation. 121

But allocative efficiency claims are seldom likely to be advanced in
justification of a merger, particularly in the premerger setting. Rather,
a range of productive and innovative efficiency claims will typically be
advanced. The most compelling claim for the efficiencies defense arises
where each of the merging firms is operating below minimum efficient
scale and where there is product complementarity. While there may not
be definitive data available to prove that each firm's plant is substantially
below the size necessary for minimum cost production, it has been
suggested that sufficiently reliable information should be available and
that "the practical problems in proving diseconomies of plant size do not
appear to be sufficiently serious to warrant disregarding the defense on
that score alone." 122
Other less compelling efficiency claims are also likely to emerge such
as distribution economies, promotional economies, economies in research
and development, capital cost economies, and the introduction of
superior management. Apart from the validity of, and qualifications
which may need to be attached to, a number of these claims in the
context of an efficiencies defense, 123 they each (with the possible
exception of capital cost economies) raise complex issues of proof.
Distribution economies involve economies of integration of a transaction
cost variety, and these are typically difficult to quantify. 124 In the case
of promotional economies, the relationship between promotional
expenditure and revenue returns is uncertain. 125 Research and development economies are particularly problematic from a proof point of
view, 126 as are claims about superior management. 127

121. BORI<, supra note 73, at 125-26.
122. 4 AREEDA & TuRNER, supra note 3 I, at I 76. Areeda and Turner also suggest
that a strong claim of efficiency can be made based on plant specialization economies
where product complementarity requires offering a range of products and where small
firms suffer diseconomies over a high proportion of their output. They do not envision
significant proof problems attaching to such claims. Id. at 178-81.
123. Areeda and Turner challenge the validity of claims about capital cost
economies because they are likely to be either small or realizable by other means; they
also submit that claims about superior management cannot be accepted in the context of
the defense. They attach a range of prerequisites to their acceptance of claims about
distribution economies (e.g., there will be economies in integration). Areeda and Turner
view claims about the promotional efficiencies to be relatively weak, but conclude that
they should not be rejected in principle. They also attach a set of prerequisites to such
claims (e.g., the merging firms should be operating at a substantial disadvantage which
cannot be overcome by means other than horizontal merger). Id. at 181-99.
124. Id. at 184.
125. Id. at 188.
126. Id. at 189-90.
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Measurement ambiguities will be most significant in the case of a net
efficiency test. Such a test is likely to be based upon some broad
formulation under which the merger may be permitted if the claimed
efficiencies are of such magnitude as to outweigh the detriments likely
to result from the attainment or strengthening of market power. 128
However, such methodology will be without analytical rigor, 129 and it
will be exceedingly difficult under this approach for firms and their
advisers to predict the outcome of any given case. Further problems
also inevitably arise in this context about the ability of the Antitrust
Division, the Federal Trade Commission, and the courts to perform the
balancing test accurately. For these reasons, it has been strongly urged
that such case-by-case analysis be avoided. 130
Measurement ambiguities will also attach to absolute formulations of
the defense. For example, under the Areeda and Turner formulation the
calculation of "substantial cost disadvantages" and the diseconomies of
plant size and plant specialization may not be straightforward. 131
Similarly, the Pitofsky formulation does not define in further detail what
is meant by "production efficiencies leading to a substantial reduction in
unit costs." However, these measurement difficulties are likely to be
much less severe than those which may arise under a net efficiency test.
Further, concerns about measurement ambiguities are reduced under an
absolute formulation of the test, such as that provided by Pitofsky, where
there is some restriction placed on the likely postmerger power which
the merged firm will enjoy. These reasons reflect that an absolute
formulation of the defense is preferable and that the defense need not be
rejected because of measurement ambiguities.

2.

Distributional Issues Relating to Cost Savings

In formulating the elements of an efficiencies defense, the question
arises whether the merging firms should be required to demonstrate that

127. Id. at 193-94. See also Pitofsky, supra note 7, at 209.
128. For a discussion of foreign jurisdictions which have adopted such an approach,
see supra note 110.
129. As Pitofsky observes: "It is difficult to trade off the advantages of lower unit
costs against the disadvantages of reduced competition as a result of the merger."
Pitofsky, supra note 7, at 210.
I 30. See Fisher & Lande, supra note 26, at 1652-59.
I 3 I. Areeda and Turner have outlined the problems of proof inherent in their
formulations. See supra text accompanying notes 112-14.
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the efficiency gains will be passed on to consumers in the form of lower
prices. This issue is concerned with cost savings (represented by area
A2 in Figure 1) rather than consumers' surplus. The question is whether
the merged firm should be required to demonstrate that it will reduce the
price for its goods to reflect the reduction in its average costs from AC 1
to AC2. While there is some support for such a requirement, 132 the
predominant view is against this proposition for both theoretical and
practical reasons.
Theoretically, the question can be approached at several levels. Some
would argue that antitrust laws are not concerned with the distribution
of wealth, and that the question of such distribution is a policy choice
to be made by the legislature, rather than the judiciary, pursuant to other
policy instruments such as taxation laws. 133 However, the validity of
such explanation must be called into question if the transfer of consumers' surplus to firms with market power is considered inappropriate from
a policy perspective. There is, simply put, a logical inconsistency
between recognizing distributional standards in the case of consumers'
surplus, and then rejecting such standards in the case of cost savings.
However, there are other theoretical arguments in support of not
requiring that cost savings be passed on to consumers, even if consumers' surplus is considered to be the entitlement of consumers. First,
notwithstanding that a firm will reap additional rewards as it becomes
more efficient, this will not lessen total wealth, and consumers will not
be worse off if prices do not rise postmerger. On the contrary,
consumers have the potential to be better off if other competitors attempt
to "imitate" and "emulate" the advantages achieved by such efficiencies.134 Second, there is the question of incentives and the need to
encourage the achievement of economic efficiency. It is inappropriate
to discourage, and in one sense unfair to punish, those who have
invested in discovering new and more efficient ways, by requiring them
to pass on the rewards to others. Inevitably, society will be better off
where there prevails an environment which is conducive to innovation
and efficiency.

132. See American Medical Int'!, Inc., I 04 F.T.C. I, 219 (1984); United States v.
United Tote, Inc., 768 F. Supp. 1064, 1084-85 (D. Del. 1991). See also LAWRENCE A.
SULLJVAN, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF ANTITRUST 631 ( 1977). The Merger Guidelines
also implicitly adopt this requirement by linking efficiencies to lower prices to
consumers. See Merger Guidelines, supra note 11, § 4.
133. See, e.g., Kenneth G. Elzinga, The Goals ofAntitrust: Other than Competition
and Efficiency, What Else Counts?, 125 U. PA. L. REV. 1191, 1195-96 (1977); I
AREEDA & TURNER, supra note 31, at I 8-19; BORK, supra note 73, at 110-12.
134. The concepts of competitive "imitation" and "emulation" are those suggested
by Roberts and Salop. See supra note I 04.
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A further reason for rejecting the requirement that efficiencies be
passed on to consumers relates to problems of proof. It is not apparent
that evidence can be introduced in support of this proposition. At best,
planning documents estimating a postmerger price reduction or evidence
of customers supporting the merger may be introduced. However, these
forms of evidence are clearly open to manipulation and it will be
exceedingly difficult to distinguish between true and false claims.
Pitofsky has suggested that:
The only sure way of making such a showing [that efficiency gains will be
passed on to consumers] would be to prove that the merger is taking place in
a near perfectly competitive market, and therefore that market forces would
require that the efficiency be passed on to consumers. But if that were the
case--if the market were that competitive--the merger would not have been a
matter of concern in the first place. 135

Strictly construed, this qualification to the efficiencies defense has the
potential to render it redundant or to frustrate its use. Having regard to
questionable theoretical foundations and potentially insurmountable
problems of proof, 136 it is inappropriate that the efficiencies defense
should be conditioned upon the requirement that the efficiency gains be
shown to pass on to consumers.

3.

Internal Expansion and Alternative Forms of Organization

A further issue requiring consideration in the formulation of an
efficiencies defense is whether the merging firms should be required to
demonstrate that the claimed efficiencies are not achievable by other
means, such as internal expansion or the formation of joint ventures.
It has been suggested that there is a "bias ingrained in section 7
favoring internal expansion." 137 The formulations of the defense
contained in the Merger Guidelines 138 and the Pitofsky proposal

135. Pitofsky, supra note 7, at 207-08.
136. A suggested solution to the problem of proof is that "rather than an outright
ban on consideration of efficiencies for which a pass-through to consumers cannot be
strongly guaranteed, a more appropriate approach would value the magnitude of the
efficiency and the probability that it will be achieved by the merger." See Yao &
Dahdouh, supra note 119, at 44. This solution appears to be no more than a suggestion
that some form of net efficiency defense may be appropriate.
137. Rogers, supra note 3 I, at 525.
138. Merger Guidelines, supra note 11, § 4.
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expressly recognize this requirement. 139 The formulation suggested by
Areeda and Turner also implicitly accommodates this consideration. 140
There is an obvious logic to this requirement. It appears appropriate that
courts should, for example, inquire whether the acquiring firm's capital
could be used to expand the firm's existing production facilities rather
than to purchase the shares or assets of a competitor. However,
acceptance of this requirement raises further obstacles to the emergence
of a workable efficiencies defense.
First, legal analysis of whether internal expansion is preferable is an
exercise which is likely to involve considerable uncertainty. For
example, it may be argued that internal expansion is preferable because
of the benefits of internal planning and internal implementation, and
because the creation of new capacity will increase output and stimulate
competition in the market. But it is also not difficult to predict a range
of arguments which suggest that merger is preferable to internal
expansion. For example, the merger may involve a matching of
resources not achievable through internal expansion, internal expansion
may be more costly and involve delays and the failure to merge may
result in the exit of a competitor from the market. 141
Secondly, consideration of these issues has the potential to raise
difficult matters of proof. There is likely to be a general lack of reliable
information. In some cases, the merger and other options may be
documented to explain the decision in favor of the merger. However,
such exercise is likely to venture largely into the realms of speculation

139. Pitofsky, supra note 7, at 218.
140. 4 AREEDA & TURNER, supra note 31, at 147-48. There is also some case law
to support this requirement that efficiencies claims should be rejected if they are
achievable by means independent of merger. See United States v. Rockford Memorial
Corp., 717 F. Supp. 1251, 1290-91 (N.D. Ill. 1989); United States v. lvaco, Inc., 704 F.
Supp. 1409, 1425-27 (W.D. Mich. 1989).
141. For more detailed consideration of these arguments, see 4 AREEDA & TuRNER,
supra note 31, at 161-69. Areeda and Turner also discuss whether internal expansion
is likely to occur having regard to the cost of expansion, the resultant unit cost savings
and the likely downward price effect resulting from the additional output. Other
variables impact on the equation such as product differentiation, the demand for the
product, and the likelihood of new entry or expansion by incumbents. While it is
appropriate to recognize the potential impact of these factors in the analysis of whether
the efficiencies are achievable by internal expansion, it seems that any attempt to
incorporate these factors into the defense is unlikely to succeed because of the widely
divergent nature of the facts of each case. See also Muris, supra note 26, at 389-92.
Muris argues that there are at least four reasons why the possibility of internal growth
does not rebut the Williamson presumption in favor of efficiency from mergers. First,
internal expansion may increase costs relative to production. Second, since cartels are
unstable, their market power tends to dissipate. Third, the possibility that collusion will
be facilitated is slight. Fourth, where demand is stable, concentration increases just as
much with internal growth as with mergers.
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and in many cases there will be uncertainty and conflict about how any
predicted situation should be analyzed. There may, nonetheless, be some
situations where the decision to merge is based upon a sound theoretical
basis and the conclusions advanced that such a merger may be the
preferred route will be all the more convincing if there is appropriate
supporting evidence, such as testimony from suitably qualified independent parties and relevant industry studies. 142 Nonetheless, in most
cases there will be information uncertainties and in such circumstances
it seems appropriate to impose a relatively weak standard of proof.
Otherwise, this requirement would have the potential to make the
defense generally unavailable. 143
The other alternative to a merger which warrants brief consideration
is the possibility that the same outcome may be achieved through
contractual relations, such as a joint venture. Two firms may, for
example, agree jointly to operate the inefficient divisions of their
businesses while still competing in all other respects. To this extent,
such joint venture arrangements may be preferable to a full merger. 144
However, there are various operational and competitive concerns under
the joint venture option which negate its desirability as an element of the
efficiencies defense. Significant disputes may arise concerning the
operation of a joint venture. It is also inevitable that anticompetitive
concerns may arise relating to the operation of joint ventures. For
example, products may become standardized and coordination of pricing
and marketing may result. These are strong reasons not to advance this
form of organization as a preferable option to merger for the purposes
of the efficiencies defense. 145

142. For a general discussion relating to the problems of proof in this situation, see
Yao & Dabdoub, supra note I 19, at 35-41.
143. Id. The current Merger Guidelines arguably contain such a weak standard of
proof by providing that efficiencies will be rejected "if equivalent or comparable savings
can reasonably be achieved by the parties through other means." See Merger Guidelines,
supra note 11, § 4.
144. For more detailed discussion of the policy considerations relating to this issue,
see John E. Kwoka, Jr. & Frederick R. Warren-Boulton, Efficiencies, Failing Firms, and
Alternatives to Merger: A Policy Synthesis, 31 ANTITRUST BULL. 431, at 438-41 (1986).
145. For further discussion on the operational and competitive concerns relating to
joint ventures and the efficiencies defense, see 4 AREEDA & TuRNER, supra note 31, at
169-71.
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D.

Enforcement Discretion

The discussion thus far has focused upon problems that the courts will
face in the formulation and application of an efficiencies defense. In
many cases, such problems will have the potential to make the defense
either unavailable or difficult to satisfy. In such circumstances,
enforcement discretion will be an issue which will assume considerable
importance. In appropriate cases, the relevant authorities may elect to
permit and not to challenge mergers involving market power concerns
on the basis of convincing efficiencies, even though there may be
questions about whether such efficiencies may satisfy the courts.
Various factors will impact upon the significance and effectiveness of
such discretionary powers. Obviously, the policies of the relevant
authorities will dictate their approach to the defense. Other factors may
be equally critical, such as the extent to which the agencies will test the
evidence of efficiencies. Close scrutiny may result in greater delays and
uncertainty than would be the case under the normal judicial process.
The information problems are likely to be significant given that the
agencies will be relying upon the evidence of the merging firms, and it
may be particularly difficult to evaluate this evidence in many cases. 146
The effectiveness of this option will also depend upon the confidence
that the business community has in the process. This will depend in
large part on the perceived reliability of the enforcement agencies, as
well as their predictability and consistency. This final point leads
conveniently into a brief consideration of the current policies of the
relevant U.S. agencies towards the efficiencies defense. The positions
taken by the federal antitrust agencies, the Department of Justice and the
Federal Trade Commission, and the State Attorneys General are
potentially in conflict on the question of how efficiencies should be
analyzed.
The Merger Guidelines, 147 which were adopted jointly for the first
time by the Department of Justice's Antitrust Division and the Federal
Trade Commission in 1992, reflect that the agencies clearly recognize

146. See Fisher & Lande, supra note 26, at 1665-66. Situations may nonetheless
arise where efficiency claims can be independently verified. For example, the recent
report of the Defense Science Board Task Force suggested that the Department of
Defense could play a constructive role in substantiating efficiencies claims advanced in
support of defense industry consolidations. See DEFENSE SCIENCE BD. TASK FORCE,
DEP'T OF DEFENSE, REPORT OF THE DEFENSE SCIENCE BOARD TASK FORCE ON
ANTITRUST ASPECTS OF DEFENSE INDUSTRY CONSOLIDATION 28-31 (April 1994).
147. Merger Guidelines, supra note I I.
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efficiencies as a mitigating factor in the evaluation of mergers involving
market power. The Merger Guidelines provide in pertinent part that:
The primary benefit of mergers to the economy is their efficiency-enhancing
potential, which can increase the competitiveness of firms and result in lower
prices to consumers ....
Some mergers that the Agency otherwise might challenge may be reasonably
necessary to achieve significant net efficiencies. Cognizable efficiencies
include, but are not limited to, achieving economies of scale, better integration
of production facilities, plant specialization, lower transportation costs, and
similar efficiencies relating to specific manufacturing, servicing, or distribution
operations of the merging firms. The Agency may also consider claimed
efficiencies resulting from reductions in general selling, administrative, and
overhead expenses, or that otherwise do not relate to specific manufacturing,
servicing, or distribution operations of the merging firms, although, as a
practical matter, these types of efficiencies may be difficult to demonstrate. In
addition, the Agency will reject claims of efficiencies if equivalent or
comparable savings can reasonably be achieved by the parties through other
means. The expected net efficiencies must be greater the more significant are
the competitive risks identified .... 148

Certain familiar themes emerge from this test. A net efficiencies
approach is adopted which is based upon the balancing of productive
efficiencies and competitive risks. The test also requires that the
efficiencies be merger-specific. Although the Merger Guidelines no
longer refer to the onus and burden of proof, it appears that no change
was intended to the prior position, namely that the merging firms must

148. Id. § 4. For a discussion of the historical approach to efficiencies in the
Merger Guidelines, see Steve Stockum, The Efficiencies Defense for Horizontal Mergers:
What is the Government's Standard?, 61 ANTITRUST L.J. 829, 831-34 (1993). The
1968 and 1982 Merger Guidelines reflected an hostility to efficiency claims. They
would only be entertained in "exceptional circumstances" and "extraordinary cases"
where there was "convincing evidence" that the merger would produce substantial cost
savings. A significant shift in attitude occurred under the 1984 Merger Guidelines in
which it was accepted that some mergers "may be reasonably necessary to achieve
significant net efficiencies." Id. at 832. The burden of proof under the 1984 Merger
Guidelines required "clear and convincing evidence" that the merger would achieve the
claimed efficiencies, and that these could not reasonably be achieved through other
means. Id. The adequacy of the current Merger Guidelines provisions concerning
efficiencies has been recently re-examined by the Federal Trade Commission. The
Commission has proposed that it should establish a joint task force, together with the
Antitrust Division of the Department of Justice, to consider how the Merger Guidelines
can be further clarified to provide an efficiency justification. For discussion of the
Commission's proposals regarding how efficiencies may be analyzed, see FTC REP.,
Anticipating the 21st Century: Competition in the New High-Tech, Global Marketplace,
vol. I, ch. 2, pp. 2-3 (May 1996).
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establish the efficiencies with clear and convincing evidence. 149 While
there are certain strict elements to this test which may be difficult to
establish (such as clear and convincing efficiencies, merger-specific
efficiencies, and lowering of prices to consumers), it nonetheless reflects
an increasing tolerance on the part of these federal antitrust agencies to
the possibility that efficiencies may be a mitigating factor. 150 Nonetheless, the strictness of the test in the longer term will depend on the
manner in which these agencies may exercise their discretion in any
case.
In contrast, the State Attorneys General view efficiencies with greater
skepticism. This is hardly surprising given their incentives to protect
local firms. The recently released Horizontal Merger Guidelines of the
National Association of Attorneys General 151 reflect an hostility to
efficiencies claims. Notwithstanding that the NAAG Merger Guidelines
conclude that there is no efficiencies defense, 152 they set forth a
stringent test for the consideration of efficiencies claims. Efficiencies
will be considered in "rare situations ... when the merging parties can
demonstrate by clear and convincing evidence that the merger will lead
to significant efficiencies." 153 Further, it must be "demonstrate[d] that
the efficiencies will ensure that consumer prices will not increase," that
"equivalent or comparable [cost] savings cannot be achieved through
other means and that [the] cost savings will persist over the long
run." 154 While it has been suggested that the degree to which the
NAAG Merger Guidelines will be followed may vary substantially across
the states, 155 it appears that given the strict requirements of this test the
State Attorneys General will rarely be influenced by efficiencies claims
in their enforcement decisions.

149.

Stockum, supra note 148, at 833-35; Yao & Dabdoub, supra note I 19, at 28-

29.
150. A recent example reflecting that these agencies may be influenced by
efficiencies considerations is the FTC's Honickman opinion. See Harold A. Honickman,
[1987-93 Transfer Binder] Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) 'II 23,286 (Nov. 16, 1992) (FTC
denied Honickman's request to acquire certain Seven-Up franchises in New York because
the claimed efficiencies did not outweigh the significant anticompetitive risks, but
granted approval for the acquisition of various New Jersey County franchises because
the competitive risks were smaller than those identified in New York, and there was
also "a greater likelihood of net efficiencies in New Jersey").
I 51. The National Association of Attorneys General Horizontal Merger Guidelines
(1993), reprinted in 4 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) ,r 13,406 (March 30, 1993) [hereinafter
NAAG Merger Guidelines].
152. Id. § 5.3. The NAAG Merger Guidelines rely upon Procter & Gamble and
Philadelphia National Bank as authority for this proposition.
153. Id.
154. Id.
155. See Stockum, supra note 148, at 836.
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V.

CONCLUSION

In recent times there has been a crescendo of academic support for the
emergence of an efficiencies defense in the case of horizontal mergers
involving market power. The motivation for this support is understandable given the importance of efficiency to the competitive process.
However, the development of the defense will involve a complex range
of issues.
While the legislative history relating to, and the judicial treatment of,
efficiencies do not appear to preclude the emergence of the defense,
there remains a pivotal concern about the circumstances in which the
goals of economic efficiency and the unfair transfer of consumers' wealth
are in conflict. There is no clear answer to how this issue may be
resolved. The legislative history suggests that greater weight should
attach to wealth transfer concerns. Further, even taking into account the
dynamic potential of the legislation, it is difficult to envision that an
appreciable shift in attitude on this issue is likely to occur until there is
compelling evidence that the vast majority of mergers are inherently
efficiency-enhancing or that the emergence of the defense is critical to
the economy. Such matters may be difficult to demonstrate, particularly
in light of the contrary conclusions of earlier studies. 156 It may
nonetheless be predicted with some confidence that the judicial hostility
to efficiencies reflected in the Supreme Court decisions of the 1960s has
subsided. The pro-competitive characteristics of efficiencies are now
more clearly understood than they were at the time of the enactment of
section 7 and at the time that they were considered by the Warren Court.
It follows that the recent trend of lower courts to at least view
efficiencies favorably is an encouraging development. However, there
remains a quantum leap that will need to be made from this point to the
emergence of a judge-made efficiencies defense. There does not appear
to be an appropriate theoretical framework to balance wealth transfer and
efficiencies considerations where they are in conflict. This is not to say
that the defense cannot emerge. But, absent some price standard in the
formulation of the defense, it will continue to be plagued with uncertainty about the unfair transfer of consumers' wealth.

156.

See. e.g., RAVENCRAFT & SCHERER, supra note I.
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Should a judge-made efficiencies defense emerge, it should be framed
in absolute terms. An absolute formulation, such as that advanced by
Pitofsky, has the following benefits. Measurement ambiguities may be
reduced to tolerable levels and this may result in greater certainty in the
application of the defense, with all of its attendant benefits. Further, a
ceiling will be placed on the level of market power that may be
achievable. Turning to the controversial elements of the defense, the
merging firms should not be required to demonstrate that the efficiency
gains will be passed on to consumers. Further, while there should be at
least some requirement that the merging firms demonstrate that the
efficiencies are not achievable by other means, this inquiry should be
limited to the possibility of internal expansion.
If progress in the development of the defense remains slow or does
not eventuate, the question of enforcement discretion will become all the
more important. The recognition of efficiencies in this way has certain
attractions, assuming that there is confidence and reasonable certainty in
the process. Under this approach efficiencies can be recognized in
appropriate cases without the need to satisfy a rigorous defense.
However, the potential for conflicting views to be taken by the federal
antitrust agencies and the State Attorneys General is a matter of concern.
Ultimately, pragmatism will need to prevail if the exercise of enforcement discretion is to provide the solution.
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